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THE NEW JERSEY ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE FOR
DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT: VANGUARD OF A "BETTER
WAY" ?*
JOHN V. O'HARAt
Early in this century, Judge Learned Hand reportedly remarked
that he "would fear nothing save death or sickness as much as he
would fear litigation."' The intervening years from his time to our own
have brought no relief from the frustration of pursuing a claim in
court. For litigants, long delays and high costs characterize the tradi-
tional judicial process, 2 while for judges there is mounting pressure to
manage cases aggressively from initial filing to final disposition in order
to control the growth of the civil docket.3 Only lawyers remain unper-
* See Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276 (1982) (Chief
Justice advocating increased use of arbitration to ease the burden on the courts).
t B.A. 1986, College of the Holy Cross; J.D. Candidate 1989, University of
Pennsylvania.
1 Carrington, Adjudication As A Private Good: A Comment, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
303, 304 (1979).
2 See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-93
(1985) (examining the causes of the "explosion in federal judicial business that has
taken place since . . .1960" through exhaustive statistical analysis); Civiletti, Zeroing
in on the Real Litigation. Crisis: Irrational Justice, Needless Delays, Excessive Costs,
46 MD. L. REV. 40, 44-46 (1986) (a study of 18 general jurisdiction state trial courts
found that 49% of tort cases took more than two years to resolve, and 10% took over
four years); Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the
Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Reme-
dies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871, 874-79, 927-36 (1983) (discussing aspects of the popular
perception of a litigation explosion and proposing use of alternative forums); Faure,
The Arbitration Alternative: Its Time Has Come, 46 MONT. L. REV. 199, 199 (1985)
(noting the negative financial and emotional effect of litigation on litigants and discuss-
ing the need to conserve legal resources); Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or
Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1984) (stating that the modem "pretrial structure
permits artful attorneys to hide the ball and keep alive hopeless claims, as well as
defenses, for a much longer time than was possible" under the old procedural system).
But see Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litiga-
tion, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 82-93, 123 (1983) [hereinafter Ordinary Litigation] (ac-
knowledging serious efficiency problems with certain types of cases, but asserting that
most ordinary litigation is cost-effective for the litigant).
' Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended in 1983 "to cod-
ify and encourage the use of case management techniques." Peckham, A Judicial Re-
sponse to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning
and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 258 (1985). Reactions
to this procedural innovation have been mixed. Compare id. at 255-60 (discussing the
utility of case management and noting its inevitable development from the advent of
pretrial discovery) with Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378
(1982) (pointing out the dangers of conferring upon courts this relatively uncircum-
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turbed: the United States has a larger bar and more lawyers per capita
than any other country, and legal expenditures continue to increase at a
rate that outpaces total economic growth.' Yet, such uncontrolled
growth is not likely to last. Only one percent of the nation's popula-
tion-consisting primarily of corporations and wealthy individuals-
consumes ninety-five percent of its legal services.5 The inefficiencies of
traditional litigation threaten, as one commentator warned, to "kill the
goose that produces the proverbial golden egg."'
Given their community of interests, it is no wonder that courts, the
bar, and potential litigants have been quick to embrace the various
forms of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") that promise stream-
lined procedures and shorter disposition time rather than the formal-
ized combat of traditional civil litigation.' Still, the growing ADR
movement has not been without its critics, who argue that the pursuit
of procedural benefits often carries dangerous substantive costs. While
admitting that ADR usually achieves the utilitarian goal of rapid and
efficient repose, these critics believe that, because of its lack of proce-
dural safeguards, it should not replace traditional litigation to any sig-
nificant degree.8
scribed extrajudicial power).
' See AD Hoc PANEL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND PUBLIC POLICY, NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC
POLICY ISSUES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7-8 (1983) [hereinafter PATHS TO JUSTICE];
see also Levin & Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV.
219, 222-23 & fig. 1 (1985) (demonstrating statistically that legal expenses are consum-
ing an increasing portion of the nation's GNP).
5 See PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 7-8.
B Statement by Ronald M. Sturtz, Chairman, Equity Jurisprudence Committee,
Essex County Bar Association, to the New Jersey Legislature 1 (Oct. 27, 1986) [here-
inafter October Sturtz Statement] (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review).
7 See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2337
(1987) (asserting that the FAA establishes a "federal policy favoring arbitration" re-
quiring that agreements to arbitrate be "rigorously enforce[d]"); Edwards, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 673 (1986) (not-
ing the rapid adoption of court-annexed arbitration in many state and federal courts);
Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A. J. 78, 79 (1985) (the number of
commercial and labor disputes arbitrated under American Arbitration Association rules
doubled between 1975 and 1985); Middleton, Burger: Arbitrate More and Litigate
Less, 68 A.B.A. J. 257, 257 (1982) (Chief Justice Burger expressing strong support for
the use of arbitration).
I See, e.g., PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 10, 13 (courts "are the appropri-
ate forum when the purpose is to establish a societal norm or legal precedent," because
arbitration frequently sacrifices quality for efficiency in decisionmaking); Bayer &
Abrahams, The Trouble With Arbitration, 11 LITIGATION 30, 30 (1985) ("consistency
and predictability are not characteristics of arbitration"); Brunet, Questioning the
Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1, 54 (1987) (the proce-
dural value of ADR may come at the expense of substantive law); Edwards, supra note
7, at 676 (proponents of ADR need to consider the dangers of broadening its scope to
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Although there are several popular methods of ADR, including
mediation,9 negotiation,1" and the minitrial," arbitration is distinguish-
able from these because it more closely resembles litigation. Generally
touted as speedier, less costly, and more amicable than conventional liti-
gation, arbitration is growing rapidly in popularity; presently, more
commercial claims are arbitrated than are tried before a jury.12
Despite this popularity, in February 1987, the New Jersey Legis-
lature enacted the New Jersey Alternative Procedure For Dispute Res-
olution Act ("NJADR Act") 3 in response to growing dissatisfaction
with the arbitration process. The NJADR Act seeks to combine the
advantages of litigation and arbitration, creating a cost-efficient system
that also ensures that some measure of procedural regularity will be
available to those who use it. On the federal level, a bill proposing a
similar ADR system was introduced in Congress in June 1987 and is
currently under consideration by the House Judiciary Committee.14 It
is expected that the so-called Federal Alternative Procedure for Dispute
encompass types of disputes more properly resolved by adjudication); Fiss, Against Set-
tlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (attacking the assumptions of the ADR
movement within the context of settlements and calling for sharp limitations on the use
of ADR); Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 494, 544-46 (1986) (the emphasis on ADR's speed and low cost ignores the safe-
guards that courts provide); Terrell, Rights and Wrongs in the Rush to Repose: On the
Jurisprudential Dangers of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 36 EMORY L.J. 541, 552
(1987)("the remedial outcome is . . . so important [to proponents of ADRI that rules
and rights as traditionally understood nearly fade from their view altogether"); Laser-
sohn, Arbitration Seems Appealing, but Has Myriad Pitfalls, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5,
1986, § 11, at 28, col. 1 (arbitration lacks predictability, checks and balances, and
effective review).
" Mediation may be defined as "[t]he process by which participants, together with
the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in
order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that
will accomodate their needs." DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3:15 (G.
Wilner rev. ed. 1984) (Practice Guide) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION].
10 Negotiation may be defined as "[tihe process of engaging in good faith efforts to
reach an agreement or resolve a dispute, through the confidential exchange of factual
statements and representations." Id. § 3:13 (Practice Guide).
"' The minitrial is "[a] means to resolve litigation between corporations expedi-
tiously and economically by providing a forum for a fight on the issues staged in private
before the real decision-makers." Id. § 3:21 (Practice Guide). It is intended to en-
courage settlement by allowing the parties to evaluate the relative strength of their
arguments in an informal, nonbinding procedure prior to trial. See id. (Practice Guide).
12 See American Arbitration Association, Backgrounder: Facts About Arbitration
(Sept. 15, 1987); see also Green, Corporate Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 203, 270 (1986) ("[Alrbitration is still considered by
many institutional litigants as the primary dispute resolution alternative. . . . More-
over, most studies show that arbitration continues to be faster and less expensive than
adjudication.").
13 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23A-1-23A-19 (West 1987).
14 See 1 Alternative Dispute Resolution Rep. (BNA) 131 (July 9, 1987).
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Resolution Act of 1987 ("FADR Act"), 5 if passed, would likely form
the basis of a model act of the Commissioners on Uniform Laws."6 In
New Jersey and at the federal level, the new ADR system would not
replace existing procedures, but rather would serve as another option
that parties may choose as they plan for dispute resolution.
This Comment evaluates the new dispute resolution procedures
created by the NJADR Act both as the synthesis of responses to popu-
lar arguments for and against alternative dispute resolution, and as the
precursor of similar statutes at the federal and state levels. The issues
addressed are of pressing concern: criticism of the ADR movement has
increased in recent years," yet the sense of institutional crisis afflicting
the courts has never been more profound."' The scope of this Comment
will be limited to the commercial arbitration context because, while
such arbitration closely resembles litigation in form, its informality and
articulated goal of achieving repose 9 as quickly and inexpensively as
possible is shared by all forms of ADR.2"
Part I of this Comment discusses the arbitration process in com-
mercial cases. The discussion encompasses a description of the statutory
and judicial treatment of arbitration past and present, a synopsis of
common arbitration procedure, and an examination of the asserted ben-
efits of arbitration. Part II compares the relative costs and benefits of
arbitration and litigation, with particular consideration of their practi-
cal and the jurisprudential aspects. To illustrate the theoretical points
made in this discussion, Part II concludes with a case study of a major
commercial dispute recently resolved by arbitration. The goal is to
demonstrate that although arbitration offers many practical efficiencies,
it also presents jurisprudential inefficiencies. Specifically, the rapid re-
pose promised by arbitration is often achieved at the expense of the
vindication of public rights. Part III evaluates the NJADR Act as a
means of dispute resolution by comparing it with the conventional
methods of commercial arbitration and litigation. This Comment con-
cludes that, despite some shortcomings, the procedural format of the
NJADR Act presents a respectable response to the ADR debate, and
15 H.R. 2721, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
ie See Lasersohn, supra note 8, § 11, at 28, col. 1; Statement by Ronald M.
Sturtz, Chairman, Equity Jurisprudence Committee, Essex County Bar Association, to
New Jersey Legislature 3 (June 5, 1986) [hereinafter June Sturtz Statement] (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
1 See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
1" See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
19 For the purposes of this Comment, repose may be defined as the resolution of a
dispute, without regard to the means employed.
20 See Terrell, supra note 8, at 547-48.
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one that may satisfy equally both court administrators and jurispruden-
tial scholars.
I. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
A. History
Arbitration is the submission of a dispute by the parties involved
to one or more impartial persons for a final and binding decision issued
after a hearing at which both parties have had an opportunity to be
heard."1 It has a long history as a means of dispute resolution, but,
until recently, judicial attitudes toward arbitration have been rather
ambivalent.22 At common law, courts rarely enforced agreements to ar-
bitrate, because arbitration was thought to "oust" the jurisdiction of the
courts.23 When one considers that early English judges were dependent
upon filing fees for their salaries, the origin of this hostility is easy to
understand.24 This judicial attitude, transported intact to the United
States, was so slow to change25 that legislatures were forced to inter-
vene and provide explicitly for judicial enforcement of contractual
arbitration agreements. In 1925 Congress passed the United States
Arbitration Act,26 commonly known as the Federal Arbitration Act
21 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (5th ed. 1979). For a succinct comparison
of arbitration and litigation, see COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, § 1:01
(Practice Guide).
22 See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, §§ 2:01-06 (Practice Guide);
Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REv. 393, 393 (1987); see also Faure, supra note 2, at 201
(arbitration "was in use many centuries before the beginning of English common
law"); Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American
Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443, 451-68 (1984) (describing the use and gradual
formalization of arbitration in Connecticut in the mid-seventeenth to mid-eighteenth
centuries); Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 854-56
(1961) (tracing the origins of arbitration back to the thirteenth century).
23 For a discussion of the "ouster" concept, see, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co.,
S/A v. Amtorg Trading Co., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942) (tracing the develop-
ment of ouster in English common law and noting its adoption by American courts).
24 See id. at 983 n.14; Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 241 (1979).
25 See, e.g., Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass.
1845) (No. 14,065) (Story, J.) ("[Arbitrators] are not ordinarily well enough ac-
quainted with the principles of law or equity [I to administer either effectually, in
complicated cases; and hence it has often been said, that the judgment of arbitrators is
but rusticum judicium.").
26 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)). Congress enacted title 9 of the U.S. Code with
the Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669, entitled "Arbitration," which repealed
the name "United States Arbitration Act," see id. § 14, 61 Stat. at 674. The FAA was
intended to "revers[el centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements." Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974).
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("FAA"),2" and today almost every state has enacted some sort of arbi-
tration legislation.28
The federal courts were reluctant to follow this explicit expression
of legislative policy, but gradually the historic judicial mistrust of the
arbitration process gave way to a more tolerant attitude. In recent
years the Supreme Court has repeatedly enforced agreements to arbi-
trate, even in cases involving antitrust or other statutory claims."0 Al-
though enforcement policies in state courts vary under state statutes, the
Court's decision in Southland Corporation v. Keating31 made it clear
that the FAA expressed a national policy favoring arbitration and
"withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties had agreed to resolve
by arbitration."3 2 Consequently, as long as an arbitration clause is itself
valid,3 the agreement to arbitrate will be enforced by the courts.
B. Procedure
In most arbitrations, the parties have agreed in advance through a
contractual arbitration clause to resolve their disputes in this alternative
forum. Such a clause typically will provide for the arbitration of "[a]ny
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the
'7 See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 2523 (1987); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 5 (1984).
28 See Special Project, Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies
in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REv. 845, 935 (1984) (noting that
every state except Vermont has adopted arbitration legislation closely resembling the
Uniform Arbitration Act); see also UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1985 &
Supp. 1987) (listing 30 states as having adopted the UAA). But see Vermont Arbitra-
tion Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5651-5681 (1973 & Supp. 1986).
29 Compare Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406-
07 (2d Cir. 1959) (enforcing the FAA), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960) with
Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868) (holding that a contractual stipulation
providing for arbitration of all disputes was not binding at common law).
30 See, e.g., Perry, 107 S. Ct. at 2526 (under the Supremacy Clause, the FAA
preempts a state law requirement of a judicial forum); Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2343, 2345-46 (1987) (RICO claims and claims
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 held arbitrable under a predis-
pute arbitration agreement); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (the arbitration clause of an international sales agree-
ment requires arbitration of antitrust claims); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 217 (1985) (the FAA requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent
state law claims upon a motion to compel).
31 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
32 Id. at 10.
11 For a discussion of the elements of a valid arbitration clause, see COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, supra note 9, §§ 5:00-7:02. See also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (stating that
all arbitration agreements under the statute are valid and enforceable unless otherwise
provided at law or in equity).
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breach thereof." 4 To further the policy of enforcing agreements to ar-
bitrate,35 the courts will interpret broadly the scope of the arbitration
clause; unless the claim alleges fraud in the inducement of the arbitra-
tion clause itself, it must be submitted to arbitration.36 Even disputes as
to the scope of the arbitration clause, or a claim that the entire contract
was fraudulently induced, must be arbitrated.37
The arbitration clause usually specifies the source of the rules
under which the dispute is to be resolved. Arbitration procedures vary
because they are administered by a number of entities, such as securi-
ties and commodities exchanges, trade associations, and the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA"). Since the AAA is "the leading
agency for the administration of every type of arbitration," '38 this Com-
ment will use its commercial arbitration rules to represent those of
commercial arbitration generally.39
Under AAA rules, a party initiates the dispute resolution process
by filing a written demand for arbitration with the Association and
serving a copy on the offending party by mail."' The standard AAA
Demand for Arbitration Form gives little information as to the nature
of the claim, leaving only one inch of space in which to state it.4' Thus,
right from the beginning, the arbitration process streamlines those pro-
cedures employed in conventional litigation.
After the claim (and any counterclaim) has been filed and shown
34 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, § 4:20 (Practice Guide).
" The FAA has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as having established a"federal policy favoring arbitration." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
36 This is a statement of the so-called "Prima Paint Rule" articulated by the Su-
preme Court. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402
(1967) (applying the FAA); see also Schneider, Inc. v. Research-Cottrell, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 1179, 1185 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (following Prima Paint); Quirk v. Data Terminal
Sys., Inc., 400 N.E.2d 858, 861 (Mass. 1980) (applying the Prima Paint rule under a
state arbitration statute). The NJADR Act incorporates the Prima Paint rule in § 5.
See The New Jersey Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act, ch. 54, 1987
N.J. LAWS 68 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-5).
17 See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402.
38 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, § 2:02; see also Coulson, Arbitra-
tion in the Eighties: How to Make it Work for You, 17 FORUM 673, 673 (1982) ("[T]he
major [arbitration] systems in the United States are administered by the AAA.").
31 AAA officials have publicly criticized New Jersey's adoption of the NJADR
Act. See, e.g., Naiman, New Dispute System Combines Arbitration, Courts, N.J.L.J.,
June 12, 1986, at 3, 3 (AAA regional director describing NJADR Act's procedures as
unnecessary and "attorney-oriented"); Chambers, Streamlining Arbitration No Easy
Matter, Asbury Park Press, Oct. 5, 1986, at Al, col. 1, A20, col. 2 (AAA president
asserting that arbitration alone is sufficient to handle cases).
40 See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Rule 7 (1986) [hereinafter AAA].
4 See Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 8, at 31.
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to be arbitrable,4 2 the AAA, with input from the parties, chooses the
arbitrator or arbitrators. The AAA maintains a roster of arbitrators
who are experts in particular fields, as well as biographies of each to be
made available to the parties. After it is contacted by the parties, the
AAA sends each side a list of potential arbitrators, from which the par-
ties strike off those they find objectionable. Each list is then returned to
the AAA, which chooses a mutually acceptable arbitrator or panel.43
The president of the AAA has noted that "[s]electing an arbitrator is
the most critical step in arbitration."""
The principal value of arbitration is said to reside in the proce-
dures that operate between the initial filing and the final award. Al-
though there is no requirement that they do so, most parties choose to
be represented by legal counsel.45 AAA procedural rules are quite sim-
ple, and generally remain so despite the parties' freedom to make them
more complex by mutual agreement. For example, AAA rules do not
explicitly provide for pretrial discovery, but the parties may agree be-
tween themselves to cooperate and exchange information."' A major
break with the formality of a trial is the lack of either common law or
statutory rules of evidence.47
The actual hearing is conducted privately, and no transcript is
kept unless the parties request and pay for it.48 The conduct of the
hearing superficially resembles a trial: each side may make an opening
statement, present its case, and cross-examine hostile witnesses.4 The
hearing room atmosphere, however, is decidedly less formal than the
42 Although exploration of the issue is beyond the scope of this Comment, the
arbitrability of a claim may itself be disputed by the parties. See, e.g., Brenner, Arbi-
tration: Compulsion and Avoidance, 17 FORUm 656, 657-64 (1982) (providing a good
discussion of disputes over whether a claim is arbitrable under the FAA).
's See AAA, supra note 40, Rule 13.
4' Coulson, supra note 38, at 673; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 24, at
245-46 ("[TIhe problem of selection makes arbitration a virtually unusable method of
dispute resolution where there is no preexisting contractual or other relationship be-
tween the disputants.").
" See AAA, supra note 40, Rule 22.
46 See AAA, supra note 40, Rule 31 (giving the arbitrator the power to subpoena
documents or witnesses either at the request of a party or on her own initiative, if the
law of the jurisdiction permits). Since the parties are adversaries, they may not wish to
exchange information voluntarily. See Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 8, at 31. Effec-
tive discovery cannot be accomplished through voluntary disclosure by the parties. See
Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1299 (1978) ("Minimal reflection reveals a funda-
mental antagonism between the goal of truth through disclosure and the protective and
competitive impulses that are at the center of the traditional adversary system of dispute
resolution.").
7 See AAA, supra note 40, Rule 31.
4 See AAA, supra note 40, Rule 23.
4 See AAA, supra note 40, Rule 29.
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solemnity of the courtroom.50
The award itself must be written"1 and submitted within thirty
days of the hearing's conclusion. 2 The award need not be accompanied
by an opinion explaining findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
usually is not.53 Thus, the arbitrator is free to decide the claim and
fashion a remedy according to her own sense of fairness. After the
award is made, the prevailing party may then have it enforced by a
court of proper jurisdiction.54 Review is extremely deferential; a court
will generally uphold the award unless the arbitrator has grossly
abused her powers55 or there is some evidence that the arbitration
award was fraudulently induced.56
C. The Advantages of Arbitration
Parties selecting ADR mechanisms generally, and arbitration in
particular, are most interested in rapid and efficient dispute resolu-
tion.51 Other purported benefits include a private forum that avoids un-
welcome publicity,5 preservation of good will between the parties,59 the
specialized expertise of the arbitrator in the subject matter of the dis-
pute, ° and freedom from being bound by established rules of law in
resolving the dispute and designing a remedy.6' Arbitration is a sensible
and convenient alternative for contracting parties, such as management
and labor, or a contractor and subcontractors, who are anticipating a
o See Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 8, at 31.
51 See AAA, supra note 40, Rule 42.
51 See AAA, supra note 40, Rule 41.
" See AAA, supra note 40, Rule 42. In fact, the AAA actively discourages arbi-
trators from making written decisions, because they would facilitate subsequent attacks
upon the award by the losing party. See R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRA-
TION-WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 26 (3d ed. 1986); Bayer & Abrahams, supra note
8, at 32; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 24, at 248 (written decisions in an
arbitration are not economically efficient).
See AAA, supra note 40, Rule 47(c).
5 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(c)-10(d) (1982); UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 12(a)(3),
7 U.L.A. 140 (as amended 1968); COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, § 34.01.
51 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)-(d) (1982); UNIFORM ARBITRATION Acr § 12, 7 U.L.A.
140 (as amended 1968); COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, §§ 34:01-02; see
also PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 13 ("The award in binding arbitration usu-
ally is enforceable by a court with little or no review.").
5 See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, § 4.01 (Practice Guide).
B See id. (Practice Guide).
5 See id. (Practice Guide).
'0 See id. § 2:01; see also Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARv. L. REv. 353, 391 (1978) ("By and large . . . the decisions of our courts in
commercial cases do not represent adjudication at its highest level. The reason is a lack
of judicial 'feel' for the problems involved.")."I See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, § 2:01.
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number of routine disputes during the term of their agreement.6 2
While the informality of the hearing readily achieves the primary
goals of speed and low cost, several other provisions are important com-
plements to meeting these goals. For example, having a dispute resolved
by an expert in the industry to which the controversy relates saves the
time and expense involved in educating a generalist judge or jury in the
subject matter of the dispute."' In addition, dispute resolution through
arbitration should generate fewer appeals, in part because judicial poli-
cies favor limited review and the enforcement of arbitration awards,
and in part because arbitrators need not apply law correctly or issue a
written opinion. The disappointed party and any reviewing court are
thereby rendered ignorant of the grounds for appeal. As a result, a
party choosing arbitration can expect greater finality from the arbi-
trated decision, reducing the likelihood of expensive and time-consum-
ing appellate procedures.6 4
The relaxed procedural rules also preclude burdensome pretrial
strategizing and manuevering, permitting the parties to focus on the
substantive issues. By eliminating extensive discovery, arbitration
removes a primary source of frustration for both commercial litigants
and trial judges.6 5 Many of the destructive effects of litigation upon
62 Some commentators take the extreme view that ADR is absolutely superior to
litigation. See, e.g., McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660,
1664 (1985) (the ADR movement rests on values of religion, community, and work-
place); Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 487 (1985) ("the quality of
dispute resolution is improved when models other than formal adjudication are used");
see also PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 8 (There is hope that ADR '"will provide
more satisfying means to justice for a larger portion of the population."). But see Abel,
Informalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law?, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 375, 383
(1985) ("Informalism is not an equivalent to law, either tactically or morally.").
83 See R. Cot.SON, supra note 53, at 9; Faure, supra note 2, at 206; Solove,
Alternative Means To Resolve Corporate Disputes: A Survey, 91 COM. L.J. 133, 137
(1986).
8' But see infra text accompanying notes 214-15 (noting that the procedural ad-
vantages of arbitration are frequently illusory when the defeated party appeals).
85 See e.g., Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers
About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 233-34 ("Even
litigators who frankly admitted that they were becoming wealthy primarily because of
fees attributable to discovery expressed amazement and concern about the rapid escala-
tion of the expense of conducting and complying with discovery."); Levin & Colliers,
supra note 4, at 231-32 (placing much of the blame for rising legal expenses on discov-
ery); Miller, supra note 2, at 9 (characterizing discovery as "a debilitating and often
interminable process"); Resnik, supra note 8, at 542 (describing lawyers and judges as
"[b]ored with the tedium of writing, answering, and ruling upon discovery requests").
The additional cost and delay related to the discovery process do not necessarily
result from abusive tactics by attorneys. See Levin & Colliers, supra note 4, at 234




business relationships probably stem from use of discovery as a weapon
of obfuscation. Therefore, if the parties are involved in a long-term and
profitable contractual relationship, they may sensibly want to avoid
these potentially harmful effects by choosing the arbitration forum.6
Finally, the parties usually perceive the results of arbitration as
fair.67 One reason for this is the arbitrator's ability to fashion a com-
promise remedy, granting the prevailing party less than might have
been received in court, thereby reducing the sting of the adverse judg-
ment on the losing party. 8 As long as the arbitrator does not need-to
justify legally her decision, she is free to fashion this sort of compro-
mise. In the end, both parties realize some degree of satisfaction and
will return to the arbitration forum in the future.
The policies presently broadening the range of arbitrable claims
and the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate69 are not antithetical to
the judicial process. There is a demand and a need for this alternative
forum, as there has been for hundreds of years: arbitration settles many
disputes as quickly, quietly, and painlessly as possible. But a growing
number of observers have recognized that arbitration and litigation are
not interchangeable means of dispute resolution, and that to treat them
as such when particular types of claims are involved is dangerous.
70
The procedural benefits are clear, but the substantive costs are only
beginning to become obvious.
II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PROCESS CHOICE
A number of commentators have advocated the substitution of
ADR procedures, whenever possible, to relieve the bursting dockets and
rising costs of traditional litigation. Their advocacy is fueled by a con-
cern for both efficiency and quality of resolution.7 ' The legal commu-
nity generally accepts the need for an alternative forum for dispute res-
olution, and the claim that many disputes can be disposed of adequately
outside the judicial system. More recently, however, other commenta-
66 Paradoxically, informality may have the effect of causing future disputes. See
Fuller, supra note 60, at 388 ("[W]here a decision enters into some continuing rela-
tionship, if no reasons are given the parties will almost inevitably guess at reasons and
act accordingly."). Thus, while arbitration may reduce or eliminate the antagonisms of
litigation, it could be inefficient in the long run by failing to alter the type of behavior
that led to the breakdown.
67 See Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 424, 429-31 (1986).
s See Solove, supra note 63, at 137.
69 See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text; infra notes 79-92 and accompa-
nying text.
70 See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
71 See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
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tors have begun to express wariness at the fervency and scope of the
ADR movement.72 While acknowledging that ADR serves an impor-
tant function as a safety valve for frustrated litigants and an
overburdened judicial system, these commentators argue with increas-
ing stridency that the attributes and safeguards of court adjudication
are unmatched by any existing system of ADR. 3
Indeed, no rational argument in favor of ADR can deny the vital
function that traditional litigation fulfills in society."4 When disputes
involve issues of legal or constitutional interpretation, or public rights,"5
formal adjudication should be the only valid form of resolution. A para-
dox is revealed when private rights are implicated. Although courts are
necessary to protect private rights, and the judicial system depends on
private litigants to pursue these rights,7 6 long delays and high costs may
72 See, e.g., PATHS OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 10, 13 (courts "are the appropri-
ate forum when the purpose is to establish a societal norm or legal precedent," because
arbitration frequently sacrifices quality for efficiency in decisionmaking); Bayer &
Abrahams, supra note 8, at 30 ("consistency and predictability are not characteristics
of arbitration"); Terrell, supra note 8, at 552 ("[T]he remedial outcome is . . . so
important [to ADR proponents] that rules and rights as traditionally understood nearly
fade from their view altogether."). Edward Brunet terms these advocates "Second
Wave" commentators. Brunet regards the Second Wave as more "balanced and skepti-
cal[,] . . . . focus[ing] upon the positive and negative attributes of litigation and of
various ADR mechanisms." Brunet, supra note 8, at 4. On the other hand "the First
Wave commentary emphasizes only the favorable characteristics of ADR and eschews
moderate viewpoints that may acknowledge positive commentary regarding traditional
litigation." Id.
" See Brunet, supra note 8, at 3-4; see also Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus.,
783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir.) ("The present day penchant for arbitration may
obscure for many parties who do not have the benefit of hindsight that the arbitration
system is an inferior system of justice, structured without due process, rules of evidence,
accountability of judgment and rules of law."), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
"' The purpose of adjudication "is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor
simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in
authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to
bring reality into accord with them." Fiss, supra note 8, at 1085; see also Edwards,
supra note 7, at 676 ("An oft-forgotten virtue of adjudication is that it ensures the
proper resolution and application of public values.").
" "Public policy should be invoked to prevent arbitration when at issue is a legis-
lative expression or a basic case law principle designed for some purpose other than to
foster justice between the parties to the dispute." Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to
Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481,483
(1981) (footnote omitted); see also Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the
Public Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 257, 261 (1987)
(describing the tension between public policies and the policies favoring arbitration).
" The antitrust laws provide a good example of such reliance. In American Safety
Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), the court stated
that "a claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter. The Sherman Act
is designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff
asserting his rights under the Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who
protects the public's interest." Id. at 826. The Supreme Court rejected this rationale in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985),
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render the courts inaccessible, and therefore incapable of effectively
performing this enforcement function.77 Arbitration may provide an ac-
cessible and efficient forum for dispute resolution, but its procedural
advantages may mask some serious substantive shortcomings. Against
the considerable weight of legislative policy and judicial opinion, schol-
ars have rightfully begun to question a balance that accords more
weight to expeditious repose than to the quality of justice dispensed."
The following discussion assesses these comparative criticisms. To
illustrate the difficulties of balancing procedural and substantive con-
cerns while maintaining the positive aspects of ADR, this Part con-
cludes with an examination of a recent commercial arbitration decision
between two of the world's largest corporations.
A. Process Choice: A Matter of Pragmatism or Misapprehension?
1. The Myth of the Litigation Explosion
A party may choose an arbitration forum for a variety of rea-
sons;7 9 the most common reason, however, is to avoid the much-dis-
cussed, yet ill-perceived, "crisis in the courts."80 State and federal
courts are becoming increasingly backlogged," inflicting upon litigants
albeit in the context of an international antitrust dispute. The Mitsubishi Court recog-
nized the public function of the antitrust laws, but argued that the primary purpose of
a cause of action under the laws was compensatory. See id. at 634-37. A comprehensive
discussion of this area of the law is beyond the scope of this Comment.
The concept of the private attorney general has been noted by the Supreme Court
in other contexts. See, e.g., Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,
502 (1969) (private attorneys-general vindicate important societal interests as well as
their own private concerns); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02
(1968) (per curiam) (same); see also Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (awarding fees to victorious plaintiffs to encourage the en-
forcement of important public policies).
7 See PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 9.
78 See Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Ju-
risdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 893, 990; see also Bayer
& Abrahams, supra note 8, at 30 ("consistency and predictability are not characteris-
tics of arbitration.").
1 See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
80 See PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 7; Alschuler, Mediation with a Mug-
ger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System
in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1817-20 (1986); Barton, Behind the Legal
Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567-84 (1975); Bush, supra note 78, at 895; Ed-
wards, supra note 2, at 872-79, 897 (1983); Friedman, The Six Million Dollar Man:
Litigation and Rights Consciousness in Modern America, 39 MD. L. REV. 661, 661-
70, 676-77 (1980); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 37 (1983); Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease,
71 Nw. U.L. REv. 767, 767-70 (1977).
si See PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 7; Edwards, supra note 2, at 877.
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both emotional frustration and financial loss, but commentators have
mistakenly placed the blame upon an overly litigious society and a con-
comitant "litigation explosion." 2
Statistics show that between 1960 and 1983 the number of filings
per capita in federal district courts tripled,s" which may suggest that
people have become more willing and able to assert their rights in
court."' On the other hand, the increase is quite reasonable given the
immense social and technological changes in this country over that pe-
riod."5 Moreover, while the number of filings has grown, the number of
cases actually litigated has remained constant with the rate of popula-
tion growth.""
The sense of institutional crisis said to be enveloping the judicial
system is not so much a problem of excessive litigiousness or immense
Current statistics indicate that the strain upon judicial resources in the federal courts is
easing. In 1986, civil filings in the districts courts declined 13%, to the lowest level since
1982, and the rate of increase in the filing of appeals in the circuit courts also slowed.
See ADMININSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (1987) [hereinafter JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE REPORT].
82 See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 80, at 61 (the widespread perception of a litiga-
tion explosion is skewed by input from elite academic, practitioner, and federal judicial
positions); Howard, Our Litigious Society, 38 S.C.L. REV. 365, 366-67 (1987) (studies
of pre-twentieth century American urban and rural areas indicate significantly more
litigiousness than exists today).
82 See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 63-64. Professor Galanter analyzed this in-
crease and found that 75% of it has come from just five categories of cases. In fact, the
federal government alone has accounted for 50% of the increase in filings through a
413% rise in social security cases and a 6,683% rise in overpayment recovery cases. See
Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 16-17 & table 2
(1986). Resolving these claims outside of the traditional court or administrative forums
is problematic, given the disparity in resources between government and private parties.
See Fiss, supra note 8, at 1076-78.
" See Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442,
442-43 (1983) (the statutory and judicial creation of "new claims, entitlements, and
causes of action" has contributed to heightened social expectations and a caseload in-
crease). But see Galanter, supra note 83, at 7 ( an increase in filings may be attributed
to causes distinct from litigiousness, such as more recalcitrant negotiations by defend-
ants, or the refusal of lawyers to get serious until a claim has been filed).
88 See PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 7; see also Galanter, supra note 83, at
18-28 (sources of the increase have varied over time and include civil rights decisions
and legislation broadening available actions and remedies); Marvell, Civil Caseloads:
The Impact of the Economy and Trial Judgeship Increases, 69 JUDICATURE 153, 153-
56 (1985) (as economic activity increases, so do interactions among people and the
number of legal claims between them).
88 See PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 7. One reason for the maintenance of
this rate is that almost 95% of cases filed settle before trial. See Miller, supra note 2, at
4 n.7 (citing ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR 142 table 29); see also NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1984 173 (1986) (finding no




caseloads as it is of increasingly complex civil litigation,"7 irrationally
high legal fees,8 and the vexing delays that continue to mount despite
increased emphasis by the judiciary on docket management.89 Still,
these myths contain enough grains of truth and have invaded the popu-
lar imagination to such an extent90 that demands for alternative forums
of dispute resolution have continued to intensify. The judicial system
itself has been quick to embrace mandatory court-annexed arbitration"1
as a means of resolving cases before trial.
One commentator has described this shift from court adjudication
to ADR as the emergence of desirable, efficiency-producing competi-
tion.92 Before hailing the arbitration alternative as equal or superior to
87 See Alschuler, supra note 80, at 1818 ("One suspects that some of those who
have decried the litigation explosion have simply misspoken. Their ill-articulated com-
plaint has not been about the volume of litigation, but rather the expanding reach of
our substantive law."); American College of Trial Lawyers, Recommendations on Ma-
jor Issues Affecting Complex Litigation, 90 F.R.D. 207, 209-10 (1981) (noting in-
creases in complex cases in federal courts); Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation - Have
Good Intentions Gone Awry?, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUS-
TICE IN THE FUTURE 209-20 (1979) (discussing complex litigation primarily in the
fields of antitrust, securities, and civil rights).
88 See Ordinary Litigation, supra note 2, at 83, 121; Levin & Colliers, supra
note 4, at 219-52.
89 See PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 7-8. The costs imposed by delays
impair the administration of justice by forcing victims to accept inadequate settlements
or relinquish their legal rights. See id. at 8.
90 See Galanter, supra note 83, at 3-5.
91 Court-annexed arbitration may be defined as the process requiring "that civil
cases involving claims for damages between the ceiling for small claims and a higher
amount (usually $10,000) be submitted to arbitration by court-sponsored panels of at-
torneys. Either party has the right to appeal the judgment of the arbitration panel."
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, § 3:25 (Practice Guide). Support for the
process may be forthcoming from the legislature in the Court-Annexed Arbitration Act
of 1987, H.R. 2127, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 133 CONG. REC. H2132 (daily ed. April 22,
1987); see 1 Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal (BNA) at 42 (May 14, 1987).
Some commentators have noted its increasing use throughout the country. See, e.g.,
PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that "there is a growing popularity of
court-annexed arbitration programs"); Edwards, supra note 7, at 673-75 (discussing
the increasing popularity of court-annexed arbitration); Hensler, What We Know and
Don't Know About Court-Administered Arbitration, 69 JUDICATURE 270 (1986)
(same); Levin, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 537 (1983)
(same); Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice, and Court Reform: Exam-
ining the Critical Assumptions, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 319, 335 (1985) ("[C]ourt re-
form efforts, especially efforts to promote ADR, need to be more focused and tailored to
particular problem areas."); Snow & Abramson, Alternative to Litigation: Court-An-
nexed Arbitration, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 43, 43-57 (1983) (examining the court-annexed
arbitration systems in Pennsylvania and California).
92 See Brunet, supra note 8, at 7 ("Competition produces shifts towards efficiency
and creates a healthy environment in which rival dispensers of dispute resolution seek
to satisfy perceived demands."). But see Carrington, supra note 1, at 303-05 (arguing
that cooperation, not competition, characterizes the relationship between private and
public judicial services, since public institutions are "reluctant suppliers," not willing
sellers, of such services).
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litigation, however, it would be wise to examine popular notions re-
garding the advantages of that forum and the frequently overlooked
costs associated with its procedural shortcuts.
2. Dispute Resolution: Means to an End, or the End Itself?
The procedural structure of arbitration has been demonstrated us-
ing the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules as the exemplar.93 Repose
is the ultimate goal; the methods are strictly utilitarian. 94 Since cost and
delay are regarded as the twin evils of litigation, each rule of arbitra-
tion is directed toward offering the benefits of fast and inexpensive dis-
pute resolution in a private forum by means of informal procedures
intended to reduce the likelihood of subsequent judicial involvement.95
In most cases an arbitration begins quietly and intentionally re-
mains so, even after the dispute is resolved. 6 Such privacy is in marked
contrast to cases that are litigated, because the function of court adjudi-
cation is not only to achieve repose between the parties, but also to
enforce accepted norms of behavior and guide future behavior through
the creation of new norms.' However, the procedural devices associ-
ated with litigation, like discovery and the jury trial, cause frustration
with the judicial process by fostering increased delay, expense, and un-
predictability.98 Disputants are also discouraged by the combative na-
ture of the adversary system, its procedural inflexibility, and the public
aspects of adjudication.99
9' See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text.
9 See Terrell, supra note 8, at 550-51.
9 Courts have long recognized the purpose of commercial arbitration and the con-
comitant substantive risk that the parties assume. See, e.g., American Almond Prods.
Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944) (parties choos-
ing arbitration "must content themselves with looser approximations to the enforcement
of their rights than those that the law accords them," because arbitration is designed to
avoid the procedural formalities that litigation employs to protect those rights).
" But see infra notes 153-69 and accompanying text (IBM-Fujitsu dispute).
9 See Brunet, supra note 8, at 16-17; Fuller, supra note 60, at 372-81; see also
Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 2, 30-31 (1979) (comparing the private dispute resolution function of arbitra-
tion with the public, normative function of adjudication).
'8 See, e.g., American Law Institute, Study on "Paths to a 'Better Way': Litiga-
tion, Alternatives, and Accommodation," 34, 39-40 (Working Paper, July 1987)
[hereinafter ALI Study] (the jury trial is a source of unpredictability in civil litigation);
Atiyah, Lawyers and Rules: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 37 Sw. L.J. 545,
555 (1983) (same); Solove, supra note 63, at 133-34 (noting that "the very nature of
the adversary process" generates dissatisfaction with litigation); see also supra note 65
and accompanying text (criticizing discovery).
" See Galanter, supra note 83, at 9, 38; Solove, supra note 63, at 134.
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a. Framing the Dispute
Procedural differences with substantive consequences between ar-
bitration and adjudication begin when a complaint is filed to initiate
proceedings. Although most courts require only notice pleading from
litigants, which is satisfied by a bare statement of the relevant facts and
issues, 00 a demand letter stating a party's intention to seek arbitration
communicates even less information to the opposing party.' 0 ' More-
over, the lack of formal discovery means that a party cannot readily
make up that factual shortfall. Accordingly, the capacity to formulate
legal arguments is diminished:"0 2 "Lawyers have little opportunity to
know the extent of the issues or to limit them before the hearing."' 013 A
harsh consequence is that the party with fewer resources is likely to be
at a substantial disadvantage when the hearing date arrives. 0 4 And as
a rule, the inability to limit the scope of the issues contested at the
hearing will waste time and perhaps confuse the arbitrator by clouding
the most relevant points of the dispute.
b. The Arbitrator
The selection of the arbitrator has been called the lawyer's most
100 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring "a short and plain statement of
the claim").
'01 See Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 8, at 31.
0'2 See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291 (1984) (citing Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974)) (the elimination of discovery
has the effect of impairing factual development).
... Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 8, at 31.
104 Antitrust cases are good examples of situations in which the parties have une-
qual bargaining power. See, e.g., Shell, A Better Approach to Contract Disputes, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 13, 1987, at A2, col. 3 (The "lack of opportunity to review documents
before a hearing in an antitrust case can be fatal to the plaintiff's chances for success.").
The problem of unequal bargaining power, however, can arise in any commercial con-
text. See Lieberman & Henry, supra note 67, at 431 ("The party with the more meri-
torious claim might not prevail because he is too poor to amass the requisite evidence
through the discovery process.").
When arbitration rules state that an arbitration clause is valid and enforceable
except "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract," 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-2(a) (West 1987), this prohi-
bition includes the inequality of bargaining power represented by an adhesion contract.
The submission of a dispute to arbitration must be truly voluntary by both parties and
not the result of a clause contained in a standard form printed contract presented to one
party on a "take it or leave it" basis. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9,
§ 5:04. In reality, however, "the courts have not favored recognition of the 'adhesive'
arbitration clause." Id.; see, e.g., Finkle & Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F.
Supp. 1505, 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (a standard form agreement between plaintiffs and
broker providing for arbitration could not be considered an adhesion contract unless it
is "not within the reasonable expectations of [the weaker] party" or, "when considered
in its context, [it] is unduly oppressive, unconscionable or against public policy").
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crucial decision, 10 5 because she will determine what law, if any, is to
apply to the facts of the case. Proponents of arbitration view this as one
of its chief benefits, because the parties may choose arbitrators who are
experts in a given field to decide matters.' Thus, the parties benefit
from the arbitrator's specialized knowledge of the trade or industry in-
volved.'07 Rather than wasting time educating a generalist judge or jury
in the customs and practices of a particular field, the parties are able to
concentrate their efforts upon resolving the dispute as speedily as
possible.
Nevertheless, the use of experts presents potential problems. Arbi-
trators familiar with an industry's practices and the reputations of its
members may bring with them not only specialized knowledge, but also
the excess baggage of deeply ingrained beliefs and prejudices.'0 8 Rather
than presuming that it is always better to have a dispute resolved by
someone familiar with the trade, prior knowledge must be balanced
against the possible loss of impartiality. Not only might the generalist
judge or jury bring a fresh approach to the problem, but the judicial
system normally presides over a dispute without expertise in its under-
lying factual milieu." 9 Perhaps the cost of educating the generalist is
merely the price to be paid for impartiality.
c. Discovery
The absence of elaborate pretrial discovery may be arbitration's
most efficient procedural innovation, since discovery is often a lightning
rod for criticism of traditional civil litigation."0 Although parties may
agree to exchange information, notwithstanding the relatively amicable
nature of the proceedings, there is likely to be little cooperation. The
FAA and some state arbitration statutes give arbitrators the power to
subpoena documents and witnesses; 1 but there is undoubtedly less
10" See supra text accompanying note 44.
10 See R. COULSON supra note 53, at 9; supra text accompanying note 63.
107 See PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 13; Faure, supra note 2, at 206;
Solove, supra note 63, at 137.
10 See Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 8, at 30.
10' Judge Edwards notes this fact, yet argues that judges are really legal special-
ists who should resolve disputes over issues of law. Conversely, when disputed issues
are nonlegal, resolution may be handled through ADR. See Edwards, supra note 7, at
683-84.
110 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 22, at 454 (discussing the advantages of arbitra-
tion's limited discovery provisions and noting that "[t]he lack of the expensive elements
of litigation is what makes arbitration so attractive"); supra note 65 and accompanying
text.
1I See 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1982) (Federal Arbitration Act); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT
§§ 7(a)-7(b), 7 U.L.A. 114 (1985); see also Brunet, supra note 8, at 33 ("[T]hese
rules constitute only a brief and ambiguous venture into the positive law relating to
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prehearing development of the facts than there would have been in a
court adjudication.
Pretrial discovery battles often serve to expose the worst aspects of
the adversary system,"' and the limitations placed on such tactics in
traditional ADR are reasonable in the routine cases involving repetitive
facts and settled principles of law that make up the bulk of commercial
arbitrations." Discovery abuses may well be an important factor un-
derlying the "failing faith" in traditional adjudication, and perhaps
rightfully so. 1 4 Discovery is, nonetheless, crucial to the process of de-
veloping facts fairly, and only by knowing the facts can a decisionmaker
possibly resolve a dispute accurately." 5 Moreover, without adequate
development of the facts, substantive law may not be correctly applied
to the case." 6 Disputants choosing arbitration must be willing, there-
fore, to forego the degree of accuracy that litigation provides through its
provisions for regulated factfinding and reliance upon established legal
principles." 7 Similarly, "[t]o permit enforcement of the arbitration
clause, [a] jurisdiction must be willing to permit the parties to contract
not only out of dispute resolution in its courts, but also out of dispute
resolution according to its laws.""' Clearly, a private party may waive
the right to have a claim based upon private rights resolved in a judicial
forum."' But these are not the troublesome cases; rather, what is dis-
discovery.").
"1 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
"" Discovery consumes time and money and can bog down disputants in trivial
disagreements. See ALI Study, supra note 98, at 33. The informal nature of arbitration
would be sacrificed if full discovery and sanctions for noncompliance were available.
See PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 13; Fletcher, supra note 22, at 454. More-
over, without the threat of judicially-imposed penalties, a party probably would not
engage in a meaningful exchange of information. See Brunet, supra note 8, at 38.
Thus, discovery is unsuited to the nature of the arbitration forum. Cf. Comment, Pre-
hearing Procedures in Labor Arbitration: A Proposal for Reform, 43 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1109, 1111 (1982) ("Traditionally, there has been no place for discovery in
arbitration.").
114 See Resnik, supra note 8, at 540, 542.
"a See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
11 See Brunet, supra note 8, at 31-39.
117 But see ALI Study, supra note 98, at 39-40 (jury trials render civil litigation
unpredictable); Atiyah, supra note 98, at 555 (same).
11' Sterk, supra note 75, at 491.
119 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3256
(1986) ("Article III's guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication is
subject to waiver, just as are other personal constitutional rights that dictate procedures
by which civil and criminal matters must be tried."). Nevertheless, parties wishing to
avoid the arbitration forum frequently dispute whether there was a waiver at all. In a
case recently decided by the Seventh Circuit, a commodities brokerage firm argued that
membership in a voluntary trade association did not constitute consent to the associa-
tion's rule requiring arbitration of customer grievances, and thus there was no waiver
of the constitutional right to a judicial forum. See Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity
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turbing is the willingness of litigants, the legislature, and the courts to
elevate the achievement of repose as an end in itself, without regard to
the actual quality of a decision or the dispute resolution process.
3. Resolution Without Reason: The Problem of Unsupported
Awards
By dispensing with written opinions, commercial arbitration's
rulemakers affirm that the correct application of substantive law to a
dispute is relatively unimportant among ADR's several goals."' 0 Pre-
sumably, it is equally unimportant to those who choose an alternative
forum of dispute resolution. Indeed, the president of the AAA actively
discourages arbitrators from issuing written decisions, because doing so
would facilitate an attack on the award by the losing party and subse-
quent judicial review.1"1 The upshot of written arbitration opinions
would be to undercut expeditious dispute resolution by impairing the
finality of the arbitrator's decision.' 22 Because this result is inconsistent
with the concept of arbitration, which intends to provide an alternative
to the formalities, the delay, the expense, and the vexation of ordinary
litigation, no written opinion is required.
Without a full development of the facts by the parties, and per-
haps possessing only a nodding acquaintance with relevant substantive
law, it may be unclear how the arbitrator actually arrives at her deci-
sion and the remedy to impose. The absence of a written opinion justi-
fying the resolution clouds the reasoning process even further. Although
ADR's proponents criticize litigation as capricious,'23 a lack of predict-
ability is perhaps arbitration's most irksome characteristic. 24 This can
Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 1987). The court denied this
claim by relying on the rejection of similar challenges 'to the National Association of
Securities Dealers' arbitration rules in Patten Sec. Corp. v. Diamond Greyhound &
Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400, 404 (3d Cir. 1987). See Geldermann, 836 F.2d at 318-
19.
The Geldermann court did recognize that a waiver may be ineffective when sepa-
ration of powers principles are implicated. See id. at 321. The court, however, held that
the arbitration rule in question did not "threaten[] the structural integrity of the courts
or the separation of power between the branches of the federal government." Id. at
323.
120 See PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 12-13 & table 4.
121 See R. COULSON, supra note 53, at 29.
122 See id. at 25. But see Lyons, Arbitration: The Slower, More Expensive Alter-
native?, 11 AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 107, 109 (in some cases, court battles over
the award make arbitration as expensive and time-consuming as litigation).
123 See, e.g., 1 Alternative Dispute Resolution Rep. (BNA), at 300 (Nov. 26,
1987) (companies choose ADR to avoid the "capriciousness" of the court system); cf.
note 98 and accompanying text (noting the unpredictability of jury trials).
124 See, e.g., Bush, supra note 78, at 988-89 & n.203 (the failure of arbitration to
apply rules correctly and communicate them to other parties makes it less efficient than
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result in similarly situated parties, before the same or a different arbi-
trator, having their disputes resolved inconsistently based upon the
decisionmaker's own notions of fairness. The principle of stare decisis,
which would conflict with the expediency of arbitration by requiring a
known and preserved body of law from which precedent could be ap-
plied, is reduced to irrelevance.1 25
The most disturbing characteristic of arbitration decisionmaking is
revealed by evidence that arbitrators frequently compromise on deci-
sions rather than resolve the underlying dispute between the parties. 2
Ironically, without a written opinion, such a result is almost predict-
able. Considering that the parties normally select the arbitrators, and
that the arbitrators only derive income when they work, it does not
require much imagination to realize that an arbitrator has a strong in-
terest in keeping everyone as happy as possible.a2 The best method of
accomplishing this is compromise; thus, in the typical arbitration,
neither side is as likely to prevail'as in the "winner-take-all" style of
adjudication. 2 ' No rights are vindicated; rather, the controversy is
swept under a rug and the parties are left reasonably-though perhaps
only temporarily-content. That such contentment exacts a price from
the rest of society is the subject of the next Section of this Comment.
B. The jurisprudential Functions of Litigation
Compromise decisions may be harmless in the routine high-vol-
adjudication in some circumstances); Lasersohn, supra note 8, § 11, at 28, col. 2 (a
lack of predictability is one of the primary complaints with arbitration).
125 Stare decisis is the judicial doctrine requiring a court to apply settled princi-
ples of law to a certain state of facts, thereby adhering to precedent. See BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1261 (5th ed. 1979). ADR, which has no requirement that decisions ad-
here to established principles, or any means of communicating the basis of a decision to
future disputants, inevitably renders this doctrine meaningless. See Terrell, supra note
8, at 543-45.
12 See, e.g., Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd.,
457 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1972) (acknowledging that arbitrators have the power to
render compromise decisions according to their own sense of fairness); Brunet, supra
note 8, at 4 (compromise is the ADR norm and the basis of its claim of qualitative
superiority); see also FORUM COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, Lrri-
GATION SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STATISTICAL SURVEY 4 [hereinafter
STATISTICAL SURVEY] (forty-six percent of attorneys responding agreed that arbitra-
tors sometimes "unjustifiably render a compromise decision").
127 See Bush, supra note 78, at 989 & n.204 (arguing that arbitrators must vary
their rules of decision to avoid rejection by parties otherwise able to foresee defeat). On
the other hand, the AAA contends that its arbitrators frequently volunteer their time or
work for a nominal fee. In complicated cases, however, payment will likely be required.
See Coulson, supra note 38, at 681.
"28 Proponents of ADR view compromise as a qualitative benefit. See, e.g., Lie-
berman & Henry, supra note 67, at 429 (freedom from legal principles allows creative
remedies that benefit both parties).
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ume, low-stakes disputes that arbitration was designed to resolve
quickly and inexpensively.129 But from a jurisprudential standpoint, the
consequent absence of identifiable decisional norms and the subjugation
of individual rights in favor of achieving repose may threaten the
proper administration of justice in both present and future cases.130
One of ADR's foremost critics, Professor Owen Fiss, argues that
"[a]djudication is more likely to do justice than . . . arbitration . . . or
any other contrivance of ADR, precisely because it vests the power of
the state in officials who act as trustees for the public, who are highly
visible, and who are committed to reason. "131
Arbitration's lack of procedural safeguards is less bothersome in
the legally routine and factually repetitive cases that frequently develop
during the term of a commercial contract."3 2 In recent years, though,
arbitration has been called upon to resolve claims based upon important
public policies.1 33 The American legal system depends upon the private
enforcement of public as well as private rights, but a problem arises
when issues of public law are hidden within seemingly private dis-
putes.1 4 Routinely resolving private disputes through arbitration or
other forms of ADR may cause important public rights issues to be
settled without much concern for the quality of the dispute resolution
process.'3 5
129 See Bush, supra note 78, at 990-91 (arbitration is more appropriate than adju-
dication in "routine cases involving purely factual issues," but not in cases involving
"numerous or important questions of principle").
... Although parties purportedly waive their rights by consenting to arbitration,
the waiver may have been neither voluntary nor permissible. See supra note 119 and
accompanying text.
31 Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1673 (1985).
132 Litigation has developed from disputes over late deliveries, inferior merchan-
dise, or nonpayment. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
723 F.2d 155, 155 (1st Cir. 1983) (arbitration concerning nonpayment of fees), modi-
fied, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1230 (7th
Cir. 1977) (arbitration concerning late delivery of alledgedly defective merchandise);
Schneider, Inc. v. Research Cottrell, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1179, 1180 (W.D. Pa. 1979)
(arbitration concerning contract interpretation and alleged fraud).
33 See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332,
2343-44 (1987) (disputes under RICO and § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934-statutes involving crucial public policies-are arbitrable).
13" See Edwards, supra note 7, at 671 (issues of public law "include constitutional
issues, issues surrounding existing government regulation, and issues of great public
concern . . . .[that] might include, for example, the development of a legal standard of
strict liability in products liability cases"); supra note 75 and accompanying text.
135 The failure of ADR's proponents to consider what is lost by diverting cases
away from litigation has created what Professor Brunet calls the "Second Wave" of
ADR analysis. See Brunet, supra note 8, at 4-6. While acknowledging the negative
aspects of traditional court adjudication, this group of commentators emphasizes instead
the advantages of the judicial system as a means of dispute resolution and the impor-
tance of its role in preserving the structure of society. Given the broad policies favoring
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1. Beyond Fees: The Intangible Costs of Arbitration
The "adjudicatory mode" offers some theory of its own limits, dis-
tinguishing between, permissible and impermissible adjudication.' Ar-
bitration, by contrast, is legitimated only by its procedural advan-
tages.' 3 Without safeguards, arbitration lacks an internal structure
akin to the common law to impart similar consistency and value to de-
cisions.' 38 The common law principle of stare decisis, for example, em-
ploys precedent established through adjudication in order to create that
structure. Arbitration decisions, on the other hand, are specific to one
dispute and have no lasting precedential value. 3 9 Arbitration, there-
fore, lacks the legal rules developed incrementally through relevant
cases that, in traditional adjudication, legitimize past decisions and
render future decisions more predictable. 4 ' Contracting parties can
better plan their behavior according to clear and consistent legal rules
as long as the parties are aware of the decisions and understand the
rationale behind the ruling.' 4 '
If enough cases are diverted to arbitration, this rulemaking power
exercised by the courts may be hindered. Besides functioning to resolve
disputes, which arbitration also accomplishes quite well, litigation facil-
itates the development of a body of law and related rules that "serve to
guide society." " 2 The creative ad hoc decisions characteristic of arbitra-
tion threaten to impair the role of legal norms in broadly guiding the
actions of society, so that any major shift from adjudication to arbitra-
tion or other modes of ADR presents questions of "significant jurispru-
dential impact."'" 3 Compromise decisions play a large part in under-
mining substantive norms; indeed, "[t]he preference for compromise
arbitration, these "Second Wave" concerns have become more pressing, and the pursuit
of purely procedural goals more troubling. Elevating the value of efficient justice, they
argue, may slight substantive process and substantive justice. See id.; Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 62, at 489-90.
... See Resnik, supra note 8, at 546.
137 See id.
138 See Brunet, supra note 8, at 19-20; Terrell, supra note 8, at 544.
"3 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
140 See Brunet, supra note 8, at 7; Bush, supra note 78, at 989; Resnik, supra
note 8, at 546.
14' See Brunet, supra note 8, at 54 ("[S]ubstantive laws 'guide' or 'order' society
generally and, in particular, affect large numbers of citizens who attempt to comply
with positive law. . . .Law's guidance function requires clear, unambiguous norms to
work effectively."); see also Terrell, supra note 8, at 545 ("The two basic functions of
general rules in a legal system are to offer guidance concerning potential future action
and to serve as standards for the assessment of past actions.").
142 Brunet, supra note 8, at 5.
a43 Id. at 7.
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erodes the very function of substantive law."' 44
In the context of considering private litigants as private attorneys
general charged with enforcing public law and its underlying poli-
cies,14 5 the debilitating effect of compromise decisions becomes clearer.
A statute is a legislative policy choice, but without subsequent judicial
development through the public resolution of disputes, that policy will
remain stagnant, or perhaps wither entirely. The ambiguous statutory
language that frequently results from legislative compromise remains
with the understanding that the courts will supply an interpretation.
Even if initial principles are established through adjudication, permit-
ting the arbitration of an entire category of claims restricts further
evolution in that area of the law by reducing the number and variety of
claims presented to the courts. This kind of substantive inefficiency,
disregarded by litigation's critics, must be balanced against the more
mundane efficiencies of time and cost that arbitration purports to offer.
Without substantive norms, dispute resolution remains undis-
ciplined and of no use to anyone but the disputants. Of course, an arbi-
trator is probably aware of the substantive law relevant to a dispute, 4 6
and may choose to apply it as best she can. However, similarly situated
parties derive no benefit when there is no reasoned opinion to explain
her decisionmaking process. Thus, although arbitration represents pro-
cedural reform, the practice of hearing every claim as if it were
presented tabula rasa would seem to be an inefficient application of
those reforms. Moreover, it allows procedural reform to "swallow
substance.'
4 7
The suspect quality of arbitrated decisions should be considered by
a reviewing court when the accuracy and basis of a decision is impor-
tant. 4" For example, one commentator has noted the troublesome prac-
tice of according preclusive effects to an arbitrated decision in a subse-
quent judicial proceeding. 49 Given the informal nature of most
44 Id. at 16.
145 See id. at 20-21.
146 This concept is referred to as "bargaining in the shadow of the law." Id. at
27-28; see also R. COULsON, supra note 53, at 31 (stating that an arbitrator is bound
to listen to the parties' legal arguments and should consider them when rendering a
decision). The pervasiveness of substantive law implies that legal principles influence
ADR proceedings, although to an uncertain extent. See Brunet, supra note 8, at 27-28.
147 Brunet, supra note 8, at 31.
148 See Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th
Cir.) ("[W]here arbitration is contemplated the courts are not equipped to provide the
same judicial review given to structured judgments defined by procedural rules and
legal principles. Parties should be aware that they get what they bargained for and that
arbitration is far different from adjudication."), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
149 See Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbi-
tration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623, 661 (1988)).
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arbitrations, and the uncertain basis of the arbitrator's decision, care-
lessly awarding the decision res judicata and collateral estoppel effects
seems unfair.15 Moreover, because the scope of an arbitration is gov-
erned by the contract that provides for it, carelessly according the deci-
sion preclusive effects may give the prevailing party more than the par-
ties intended when they entered into the agreement. 51 Motivated in
part by the perceived "litigation explosion," however, courts have freely
applied preclusion doctrines to arbitration without weighing the differ-
ences in procedural regularity or the intent of the parties.1 52
2. Case in Point: The IBM-Fujitsu Arbitration Decision
A major case arbitrated under the auspices of the AAA brings to
life many of the positive and negative characteristics of arbitration as
compared to litigation, particularly the assertion that "ADR focuses on
the ending of a dispute and the creation of a framework for avoiding
future disputes.' 53 In that case, IBM, the largest computer manufac-
turer in the world, and Fujitsu, the largest Japanese computer manu-
facturer, resolved a long-standing battle over Fujitsu's development of
IBM-compatible operating system software.15 4 Such development re-
quired access to information that IBM alone possessed, and IBM de-
manded compensation for the privilege of using that information. Since
copyright law in this particular area remains unsettled, the parties
could not agree whether such information was protected by law from
unauthorized use.' 5  An earlier agreement between the parties requir-
ing Fujitsu to make substantial semiannual payments for obtained in--
formation had quickly collapsed under the weight of undefined
terms. 5 ' Fujitsu had been selling the IBM-compatible software to its
customers for a long time, so that large amounts of money and the good
150 See id. at 657-60.
151 See id. at 662.
152 See id. at 661.
'-3 Brunet, supra note 8, at 14.
See IBM v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 13T-117-0636-85 (AAA Commercial Arbitra-
tion Tribunal Sept. 15, 1987) (Jones & Mnookin, Arbs). "An operating system is an
organized collection of software used to assist and in part control the operations of a
computer. Operating systems generally manage the internal functions of the computer
and facilitate the use of applications software." Id. at 3-4. The operating system pro-
grams involved in this arbitration were large and complex, representing an investment
of hundreds of millions of dollars. See id. at 4.
155 See id. at 5-6, 29 n.8.
155 See id. at 6-8. For example, Fujitsu promised to respect IBM's intellectual
property rights, but the scope of those rights and the applicable law were not defined.
See id. at 8. Moreover, neither the type of information obtainable by Fujitsu nor the
price to be charged for its use was specified. See id.
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will of many Fujitsu customers were at stake.15
The arbitrators' remedy was so unique, and the stakes so high,
that the AAA placed full-page advertisements announcing the decision
in The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. 5 The arbitra-
tors' order resolved all past claims between the two parties and estab-
lished a structure to inhibit future disputes. 59 The forward-looking
agreement entailed the construction of a "Secured Facility" in which
Fujitsu would be allowed to examine information possessed by IBM
necessary to the continued production of compatible software. In re-
turn, IBM received a lump sum payment for past, present, and future
use of its materials and for the substantial investment involved in their
development-a de facto license obtained by Fujitsu. 60 IBM was given
the right to examine Fujitsu data, but does not expect to exercise it. A
neutral third party, supervised by the arbitrators, will strictly control
this exchange process for the duration of the agreement-a period of
between five and ten years.1 61 Information properly obtained by either
side at the Secured Facility will be immune from claims of copyright
infringement.' 62
The nature of this remedy underscores both the flexibility availa-
ble to disputants choosing arbitration and the benefit of having experts
serve as arbitrators. One of the arbitrators is a retired computer expert,
the other a law professor specializing in the study of alternative forms
of dispute resolution.'6 3 This expertise undoutedly assisted them in un-
derstanding the facts and fashioning an appropriate remedy. Moreover,
the controversy was resolved in less than two years-substantially less
time than might have been expected had the case been formally adjudi-
cated.164 Finally, the legal fees, while no doubt large, were most likely
smaller than they would have been had the dispute been litigated.
The order also achieved a consistent outcome between the parties,
a substantial benefit given the size of the stakes involved. 6 ' IBM will
have knowledge of Fujitsu's software development before the product
"I See id. at 5-6.
1.. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1987, at D17; Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1987, at 21.
'5 See IBM, at 1-3.
160 See id. at 20-28.
161 See id. at 21.
162 See id. at 21-22.
16" See AAA, Arbitrators Resolve IBM-Fujitsu Software Dispute, Press Release,
at 1 (Sept. 15, 1987) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
16 In 1984, the median time to disposition for litigated cases in the federal district
courts alone was nineteen months. See Galanter, supra note 83, at 26 table 4.
16 The arbitration decision did not reveal the amount of money Fujitsu paid, but
the economic might of the parties indicates that the sums at stake were probably very
large. See Arbitrator J. Jones, Statement at Press Conference 3 (Sept. 15, 1987) (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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hits the market, and Fujitsu knows that IBM cannot bring any claims
against it related to material properly acquired at the'Secured Facility.
Perhaps most important, a stable, working relationship was preserved
between two powerful multinational corporations to both of their bene-
fits and the benefit of their many customers. As one of the arbitrators
noted, "It is because both companies prefer to devote resources to mar-
ketplace competition rather than copyright and contract battles that this
order is possible."' 66 While it is the rare company that would prefer
litigation to business as usual, the spirit of his assertion is accurate:
economic resources were put to a more efficient use.
Lost, however, was an opportunity for the judicial system to fur-
ther the substantive development in this particular area. The facts and
issues involved in this controversy were rich;167 the uncertainty of ap-
plicable copyright law would have sharpened the controversy. Although
the parties were most concerned with the issue of compensation, the
ultimate resolution of this concern was dependent upon whether or not
IBM's intellectual property rights had been violated, an issue deemed
too costly and time-consuming to resolve.'
Rather than having been permitted the opportunity to settle an
area of intellectual property law, society has been left to interpret the
meaning and relevance of a compromise decision. Computers pervade
society, and their influence can only expand. If copyright law is to ap-
ply at all, courts should have an opportunity to direct the development
of that law in relation to the computer industry. Although private par-
ties are not obligated to litigate their disputes, IBM and Fujitsu had
the resources to obtain the best legal talent available and withstand the
financial burden of adjudication.' 69
"6 Arbitrator R. Mnookin, Statement at Press Conference 4 (Sept. 15, 1987)
[hereinafter Mnookin Statement] (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review).
7 See id. at 12 ("The Panel has received an astounding volume of letters, memo-
randa, documents and exhibits on numerous points and issues.").
I68 See id. at 3. As Fujitsu's lead counsel explained with unintended irony, "Ex-
isting copyright doctrine is not particularly well-suited, in our view, to resolution of
computer software development issues. We believe alternative methods of dispute reso-
lution, such as those employed in this arbitration, are more likely to produce rational
answers to these issues than conventional litigation procedures." R. Raven, Statement
in Press Conference Press Kit Concerning the IBM-Fujitsu Dispute 1 (Sept. 15, 1987)
(on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
169 The argument that private parties should not be expected to bear the addi-
tional costs of litigation would be persuasive if it were valid. However, the assumption
that private parties usually spend more money in court is simply not true. See Kritzer
& Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of Case Processing
Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the
Courts, 8 JusT. Sys. J. 6, 14-19 (1983). Complex cases cost more in both forums, and
publicly-funded courts actually cost less to use than the entirely fee-supported arbitra-
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The IBM-Fujitsu arbitration exposes the difficult questions gener-
ated by the growth of the ADR movement. It illustrates the costs in-
curred when issues on the cutting edge of the law are diverted to the
various ADR systems: legal rules are denied a chance to evolve, to the
detriment of the legal process. In this case, because the arbitrators were
free to ignore copyright doctrine, an opportunity was squandered to
refine that doctrine further.
Resolving this dispute in an alternative forum saved time and
money and achieved repose between the parties. In addition, similarly
situated parties on their own may adopt the creative remedy produced
in this dispute, thereby eliminating the need for courts to revisit the
factual and legal tangle that characterizes computer industry disputes.
The failure to develop a new principle of intellectual property law,
however, imposes broader costs upon society. The arbitrators' remedy
in this case is temporary and applicable only to the two parties in-
volved. As a result, other members of the industry have been denied the
guidance that a legal rule would impart upon their dealings with one
another, so that these companies may be forced to bear the costs of an
adverse decision either in future court cases or arbitration decisions.
Moreover, an eventual resolution of the larger legal issues was merely
postponed, perhaps left to .smaller and less financially capable players
to settle in court. Given these factors, many of the resources employed
to arrive at the IBM-Fujitsu decision may have been wasted, from soci-
ety's point of view.
Theoretically, judicial resolution would have governed the dealings
of all similarly situated parties and achieved repose of the issues, at
least temporarily. Frustration with the expense and delay of traditional
litigation, however, encouraged the parties to pursue resolution in an
alternative forum. Although the parties are satisfied with the resolution
of their dispute, and finite judicial resources were conserved, the arbi-
tration imposed substantive costs upon the parties and society. The
tion forum. See id. at 17. No additional burden is imposed on private litigants if use of
the courts is encouraged for particular disputes. Arbitration may be faster than adjudi-
cation, however, even with any subsequent appeals from the arbitrated award. See id.
at 11-14, 18. Arguably, streamlined procedures could remove any disparity caused by
delayed access to the courts.
Implicit in the result of the IBM-Fujitsu arbitration is the fact that what is best
for private litigants is not necessarily best for society. The norms that society may de-
rive from formal adjudication require the parties involved to endure "weighty opportu-
nity costs." Brunet, supra note 8, at 51. Consequently, "the demand for judicially im-
posed substantive norm enforcement barely exists." Id. Thus, society cannot rely upon
private parties to enter the public forum when an issue needs to be litigated if a satis-
factory resolution of the dispute can be achieved in an alternative forum such as arbi-
tration. In order to ensure that norms are created and enforced, the use of courts should
be encouraged for particular types of cases.
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challenge remains to ameliorate these substantive costs as much as pos-
sible without sacrificing the procedural benefits of ADR generally, and
arbitration in particular. The next Part of this Comment will explore
the balance that must be struck between substantive norms and expedi-
tious procedures.
III. THE NEW JERSEY ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION ACT
A. The Goal of Reform
The goal of ADR's reformers is to protect the quality of justice
dispensed in alternative forums such as arbitration.7 0 This Comment
emphasizes the need for reform in commercial arbitration procedures so
that statutory policies' will be adequately enforced and substantive
law17 2 correctly applied.'7 3 The NJADR Act provides the precise sys-
tem of checks and balances suggested by this critique of arbitration,
including streamlined procedures necessary for efficient repose and sub-
stantive safeguards necessary to protect public rights. 4
170 See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text; supra notes 133-35 and accom-
panying text.
12 See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
171 See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 8, at 54-55 ("[P]rocedural innovation is needed to
ensure that ADR, like any procedural reform, remains subordinate to substantive
law."); Edwards, supra note 7, at 676-78 (arbitrators should be restricted to private
disputes in order to protect established public rights); Shell, supra note 104, § 3, at 2,
col. 3 (arguing that if antitrust disputes are to be arbitrated, procedures must be modi-
fied to protect the policies underlying antitrust laws).
174 See infra notes 185-214 and accompanying text. The development of the
NJADR Act was precipitated by the unusual state of arbitration law in New Jersey
after two decisions, Grover v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 221, 403 A.2d
448 (1979), and Communications Workers of Am. v. Monmouth County Bd. of Social
Servs., 96 N.J. 442, 476 A.2d 777 (1984), in which the state supreme court held that a
mistake of law by an arbitrator was grounds for reversing the award on review. See
Grover, 80 N.J. at 230-31, 403 A.2d at 451; Communications Workers, 96 N.J. at
453, 476 A.2d at 781. This holding was startling because it contradicted the weight of
judicial opinion, in New Jersey and elsewhere, that had normally upheld arbitration
awards even if they were intentionally decided contrary to applicable law. See Grover,
80 N.J. at 234-36, 403 A.2d at 454-56 (Pashman, J., dissenting); Carpenter v.
Bloomer, 54 N.J. Super. 157, 168, 148 A.2d 497, 503 (App. Div. 1959) (an award will
not be set aside because a court would have construed law differently); Collingswood
Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. American Fed'n of Hosiery Workers, 31 N.J. Super. 466, 471,
107 A.2d 43, 45 (App. Div. 1954) (an arbitrator may decide "according to his own
concept as to what is just and right"); see also La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan,
Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1967) (an arbitrator's "decision will not be disturbed
for a mistake of fact or law"); Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 629, 389 N.E.2d
456, 458-59, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (1979) ("an arbitrator's award will not be vacated
for errors of law and fact"); Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 385, 278 N.E.2d 633,
635, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421 (1972) ("arbitrators are not bound by principles of sub-
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If the safeguards accompanying court adjudication are added to the
arbitration structure, however, "have we done anything other than
reinvent the wheel?"1 5 If the primary motivation for choosing commer-
cial arbitration is streamlined procedures, which have the concomitant
benefits of speed and low cost, would not the addition of an elaborate
judicial-type structure be self-defeating? If commercial arbitration be-
comes a replica of traditional litigation, then its attractiveness as a form
of ADR will disappear, and its value as an alternative to litigation will
be negated. As discussed below, however, the NJADR Act has bal-
anced procedural reform with certain limiting principles, a compromise




As a result of this shift in the standard of review, and the fact that arbitrators
rarely explain the reasons underlying an award, arbitration in New Jersey became
more than ever a beginning to litigation rather than an end. Cf Grover, 80 N.J. at
237, 403 A.2d at 456 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's review of
an arbitration proceeding was setting a precedent that would allow parties a hearing de
novo, thus making arbitration a mere springboard to litigation). A disappointed party
would almost always have an incentive to attack the award, because without an opinion
setting forth the basis of the decision, it is difficult to determine the law that the arbi-
trator applied.
The New Jersey Supreme Court further confused this issue when it held in Heff-
ner v. Jacobson, 100 N.J. 550, 498 A.2d 766 (1985), that common law rules were
applicable in statutory arbitration if the contract's arbitration clause was silent as to
whether the common law or the arbitration statute applied to the underlying dispute
between the parties. See id. at 554-55, 498 A.2d at 768. The coexistence of common
law and statutory arbitration rules is common, see COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra
note 9, § 3:02, and other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion on the issue,
see Heffner, 100 N.J. at 554-55, 498 A.2d at 768; see also La Vale Plaza, 378 F.2d at
571-72 (indicating that under the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act of 1927, the parties
must specifically refer to the Act in order to have its provisions, and not the common
law, apply); A.J. Curtis & Co. v. D.W. Falls, Inc., 305 F.2d 811, 813 (3d Cir. 1962)
(same); Jones v. John A. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 129 N.Y.S.2d 479, 481 (1954) (same).
Heffner and Grover render the result under judicial review entirely dependent upon
the standard of review applied, which in turn depends upon the rules under which the
case has been arbitrated. See Lasersohn, supra note 8, § 11, at 28, col. 2. Arbitration
awards under the state arbitration act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24-1-24-11 (West
1987), must be in accord with applicable law after Grover, but common law arbitration
awards are still reviewed under the familiar "manifest disregard of the law" standard.
The additional unpredictability introduced into commercial arbitration by these
decisions gave ADR reformers in New Jersey the incentive to devise a new structure
for the nonjudicial resolution of commercial disputes. See Lasersohn, supra note 8,
§ 11, at 28, cols. 1-2; June Sturtz Statement, supra note 16, at 1-2.
'7 Resnik, supra note 8, at 554.
178 Similar to arbitration in many respects, the procedure established by the
NJADR Act is meant to compete with existing forms of ADR rather than replace them
outright. The procedure is entirely voluntary and must be designated by the parties as
the source of rules governing dispute resolution. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-2(a)
(West 1987). Still, its proponents would like to see it supplant commercial arbitration.
See Naiman, supra note 39, at 3, col. 4 (reporting that NJADR Act state assembly
sponsor Robert J. Martin stated, "Businessmen have no confidence in arbitration. The
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The heart of the Act is the provision requiring the umpires, the
system's decisionmakers, to resolve disputes according to substantive
law.177 This requirement follows inevitably from the body of New
Jersey case law holding arbitrators to an identical standard of accurate
decisionmaking as judges.1 8 Additionally, other procedural innovations
were needed to facilitate the rendering of legally correct decisions.
Thus, rather than focusing purely on achieving the rapid repose that
arbitration promises, the NJADR Act seeks to enhance the quality of
the result reached.'1 9 Critics dismiss the Act as an unnecessary hybrid
of arbitration and litigation-a reinvention of the wheel.' 80 In fact, the
NJADR Act is a careful blend of existing modes, offering procedural
convenience and substantive protection,'' the goals of which are to
confer predictability upon ADR decisionmaking and facilitate review of
those decisions in the courts.'82
B. The Act's Mechanism
1. Jurisdiction
As with statutory arbitration, the parties must voluntarily invoke
the jurisdiction of the NJADR Act; they must either specify in the text
of their agreement that any disputes arising under the contract will be
resolved under the Act, or agree after the dispute has arisen to submit
their claims to this process for resolution.'8 3
Voluntary election underscores the fact that conventional arbitra-
tion is well suited to resolution of particular types of disputes, and that
to force these into the NJADR Act procedures is inefficient. For exam-
ple, if preservation of a business relationship is most important to the
parties, as it was in the IBM-Fujitsu arbitration, efficiency will be the
primary factor in choosing a mode of dispute resolution. Thus, al-
though one could argue that the need for NJADR Act procedures in
any context could be obviated by amending the FAA or state arbitra-
problem is that it is often the start of litigation .... "); October Sturtz Statement,
supra note 6, at 1-3.
17 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-12(e) (West 1987).
178 See supra note 174.
1I See Lasersohn, supra note 8, § 11 at 28, col. 2; see also supra notes 120-28
and accompanying text; 137-52 and accompanying text (the quality of ADR depends
upon accurate factfinding and correct application of substantive law).
180 See, e.g., Naiman, supra note 39, at 3, col. 4 (statement of Richard Naimark,
regional AAA director).
181 See infra notes 184-214 and accompanying text.
182 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-12 at 47 (West 1987) (Draftsman's Legisla-
tive History).
181 See id. § 2A:23A-2(a).
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tion statutes, such additional procedures are superfluous in the average
commercial dispute and would only prove to be burdensome.
On the other hand, if the parties believe that the dispute is very
important, they may want it decided according to law, with detailed
factual findings and a written opinion. Perhaps, as in the context of
securities arbitration, one party fears that its inferior bargaining power
will compromise its rights in a forum in which the opposing party ex-
erts substantial influence. Regardless, establishing alternatives allows
the parties to designate the best forum for the resolution of a particular
dispute.
Private parties, however, cannot be expected, to safeguard institu-
tional interests and legislative policies when choosing a method of dis-
pute resolution. This problem has been further exacerbated by the Su-
preme Court's strong encouragement of arbitration in recent years.
Perhaps the Court would not be as enthusiastic about the arbitration of
certain categories of disputes if an alternative were available that could
provide some degree of substantive protection without taxing judicial
resources. In this respect, the NJADR Act procedures are a convenient
compromise: if a party challenged an agreement to arbitrate and impor-
tant rights were implicated in the dispute, the courts could have an
alternative to arbitration. Of course, a court could not arbitrarily void
an arbitration agreement between the parties, but it could conceivably
require more formalized procedures in the name of public policy.
Once jurisdiction has been established, differences begin to appear
between NJADR Act procedures and those of AAA commercial arbi-
tration. In demanding the resolution of the dispute, a party must pro-
vide written notice setting forth all claims, defenses, and the relief
sought."" The notice given an opposing party is thus sufficiently in-
formative to permit a fair development of both sides of the argument; at
a minimum, the opposing party knows its position relative to the com-
plainant before further communication is undertaken.
2. Umpires
The process of choosing an umpire, as the judges are called under
the NJADR Act, differs from the selection of arbitrators under AAA
rules. Only one umpire is appointed according to a pre-established pro-
cedure set forth in the contract, which either designates the umpire or
18 See id. § 2A:23A-4(a). In a survey of attorneys experienced in arbitration of
construction industry disputes, 79% wanted the complaining party to be compelled to
file a detailed statement of the claim prior to the proceeding. See STATISTICAL SURVEY,
supra note 126, at 6.
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describes a process for her selection.185 She need not have legal train-
ing."' If the parties fail to agree upon an umpire for any reason, then
the state Superior Court may appoint one in a summary action and set
her hourly fee if the rate of pay has not been designated by the
parties.1
8 7
The umpire's scope of authority is identical to that of an arbitrator
and follows the Prima Paint Rule. 88 An important modification under
the NJADR Act is to vest in the umpire the power to grant provisional
remedies as if she were an inferior state court operating under the state
constitution.' 89 Since significant amounts of money could be tied up
through these measures by the order of a legally untrained umpire, the
court reviews and enforces the granting of provisional remedies in an
expedited proceeding.' 90 Bestowing this remedial power on umpires is
intended to reduce the amount of ancillary litigation over procedural
matters that may develop in a dispute otherwise properly diverted to
ADR.' 91
3. Prehearing Procedures
Prehearing procedures under the NJADR Act have been aug-
mented to facilitate factual development sufficient to allow the correct
application of substantive law. One modification of AAA rules is a pro-
vision allowing formalized discovery, but limiting it to oral depositions
and the production of documents, all of which must be completed
within sixty days after receipt of the demand for alternate resolution or
the entry of a final order compelling alternate resolution.' 92
Although both the time limit and the permissible methods of dis-
covery are subject to expansion according to the umpire's discretion,'93
such a rule seems to be an apt compromise. The procedure minimizes
the escalating cost and frustration associated with discovery requests;"'
4
186 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-9(a) (West 1987).
188 There is no statutory requirement that an umpire have legal training.
187 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23A-9(a)-23A-9(b) (West 1987).
18 See id. § 2A:23A-5(a); supra note 36 and accompanying text.
189 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23A-6 (West 1987).
190 See id. This provision was added to the NJADR Act at the insistence of the
Governor's Office. See id. § 2A:23A-1, at 33 (Governor's Reconsideration and Recom-
mendation Statement).
191 See id. § 2A:23A-6, at 39 (Draftsman's Legislative History) (noting that
neither the New Jersey Arbitration Act, the FAA, nor the UAA authorizes arbitrators
to issue such orders).
182 See id. § 2A:23A-10(b).
182 See id.
18, See supra note 65-66 and accompanying text; supra notes 112-17 and accom-
panying text.
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rather than depending upon the parties' voluntary cooperation with
each other at a time when it may not be forthcoming, mandatory dis-
covery will ensure a fair and equal opportunity to construct a case so
that the umpire can better evaluate the claims. In some disputes pres-
ently subject to arbitration, discovery is essential to a fair contest on the
merits.1 95 Recognizing the frequently realized potential for abusive de-
lays in conventional discovery processes, however, the Act sharply limits
its parameters. 96 The goal is to provide some semblance of the factual
development attained in litigation, but at a reduced cost.
Because the parties submit briefs to the umpire stating the factual
and legal issues to be resolved, each party must "undertake a detailed
factual development of its case." 7 The parties' submissions limit the
matters to be resolved at the hearing, but supplementary briefs are per-
mitted at the umpire's discretion. 9 Unless the parties have access
through discovery to relevant materials possessed by the other side, the
briefs and subsequent findings by the umpire are likely to be incom-
plete,. if not inaccurate. Furthermore, the ability of the umpire to fash-
ion a more creative resolution of the dispute than the law allows is
curtailed, because both the facts and the law relevant to the decision are
limited to those covered by the briefs. Applicable law is set forth for the
umpire and she is bound to adhere to it. In making her award, an
umpire is compelled to consider only matters that the parties believe
apposite. Finally, the briefs are more likely to present a balanced view
of the dispute than would the "position papers" employed in the arbi-
tration forum for the same purpose.1 99
The only technical rules of evidence applicable to dispute resolu-
tion under the NJADR Act are those relating to privilege.200 One small
procedural exception that has a large substantive effect, however, is the
power of the umpire to call an expert witness at the expense of the
parties.2"1 This provision is particularly important because the umpire
need not be an expert in the subject matter of the dispute, and, given
195 See Shell, supra note 104, at A3, col. 3. A survey of attorneys with experience
in arbitration of construction disputes revealed that 80% wanted discovery by the arbi-
trator to be permitted. See STATISTICAL SURVEY, supra note 126, at 6.
19I See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-10 (West 1987).
197 See id. § 2A:23A-11(e).
199 See id.
199 See Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 8, at 31-32 ("The parties' briefs [in arbi-
tration] do not discuss strengths and weaknesses. . . . Position papers often attempt to
play on the lay-arbitrators' natural prejudices, using anything available to support the
allegations.").
200 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-11(d) ("all statutes and common law rules
relating to privilege shall remain in effect").
'01 See id. § 2A:23A-11(f).
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the requirement that a decision be legally correct, will likely be chosen
instead from among lawyers and retired judges in order to protect the
award's finality.
20 2
The expert witness provision appears to be aimed at retaining the
benefit of expertise associated with the traditional arbitrator.2 0 3 The
additional cost to the parties should be balanced against the fact that
they would pay a premium fee for the most qualified arbitrators.2 '
The umpire can obtain expert knowledge as an additional aid in under-
standing the facts of the dispute just as a court might, thereby eliminat-
ing one line of attack upon the procedures by arbitration's proponents.
If the witness has the bias feared by critics of arbitration,20 5 at least the
parties have an opportunity to impeach the witness at the hearing; in
contrast, the parties would find it awkward to impeach an arbitrator
for bias before the conclusion of an arbitration. After the award, the
standard of review places a heavy burden on the party seeking to prove
bias.20 Finally, the expert witness provision may help to diminish self-
interested opposition to similar ADR reform in other states and at the
federal level. After all, the present arbitrators would be most qualified
to serve as experts.
Another measure intended to expedite the final resolution of a dis-
pute is the option to combine into one consolidated action several differ-
ent ADR proceedings between the parties, or an ADR proceeding and
a court action.207 This method can help to eliminate costly and time-
consuming stay proceedings, as well as preclusion problems when
claims are not resolved simultaneously.
20 8
4. The Award
The most radical innovation offered by the NJADR Act is the
requirement that the umpire submit a written opinion with her award,
stating findings of fact and conclusions of law.2 09 The purposes of this
provision, in conjunction with the requirement that the law be correctly
202 See Naiman, supra note 39, at 3.
203 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
204 See Coulson, supra note 38, at 681.
210 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text; see also Lasersohn, supra note
8, § 11, at 28, col. 1 (stating that an arbitrator "has virtually unlirited power to
decide a case submitted to him as he chooses, regardless of the facts, the provisions of
the contract or the law").
210 Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a disappointed party must prove the parti-
ality or corruption of the arbitrator. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)-10(b) (1982). This will be a
difficult feat with no requirement of a transcript, findings of fact, or conclusions of law.
217 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-3 (West 1987).
208 See id. § 2A:23A-3, at 36 (Draftsman's Legislative History).
209 See id. § 2A:23A-12(a),(e).
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applied, are to impart a high degree of predictability to ADR, to guar-
antee the quality of the decision by eliminating any temptation to com-
promise, and to facilitate subsequent judicial review.210 The apparently
solid foundation of this section provides promise for efficient procedures
explicitly aimed at increasing predictable, quality results.2"' Proponents
of arbitration use this provision as an easy target. They argue that the
NJADR Act compromises the very finality that motivates parties to
choose ADR over litigation by facilitating review. By requiring adher-
ence to substantive law, they suggest, persons without legal training are
held to an extremely high standard, perhaps precluding them from
serving as umpires. They also argue, most broadly, that it is an unnec-
essary legalization of the arbitration process.
2 12
5. Review
The drafters of the NJADR Act insist that the provision for only
a single expedited appeal from an umpire's decision213 improves upon
the finality offered by arbitration, because arbitration may actually
serve as a preliminary to litigation in many cases anyway.214 AAA
rules seek to enhance finality by obscuring the substantive basis of an
arbitrator's decision; the NJADR Act accomplishes the same end by
enhancing the substantive quality of the process while limiting the
availability of review. Whether the total burden on the courts will be
less than that inflicted by appeals from arbitration remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
In the real world of commercial disputes, comparative analyses of
arbitration, litigation, and the new forum under the NJADR Act are
irrelevant unless the parties actually choose the most efficient forum for
210 See id. § 2A:23A-12, at 47 (Draftsman's Legislative History).
211 See id.
212 See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 39, at 1, 20 (Some in the arbitration industry
say that the NJADR Act's appeal provision would defeat the purpose of arbitration.);
Naiman, supra note 39, at 3 (The NJADR Act would discourage the use of nonlawy-
ers as arbitrators, and would unnecessarily legalize the arbitration process.); see also
Sterk, supra note 75, at 484 n.9 (The desire to maintain confidence in the system of
arbitration serves as "an incentive for a resolution that seems equitable to the parties
and a disincentive to consider factors extraneous to justice between the parties.").
212 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-13. But see id. § 2A:23A-13(c)(5) & (e)(4)
(an award can be modified or reversed if it is not in accordance with applicable law).
214 See supra note 66; cf. Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d
304, 305 (2d Cir. 1967) ("Arbitration is often thought of as a quick and efficient
method for determining controversies. Unfortunately, cases involving arbitration clauses
sometimes are best remembered as monuments to delay because of the litigation and
appeals antecedent to the actual arbitration.").
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the resolution of a particular dispute. When inserting a dispute resolu-
tion clause into their agreement, contracting parties probably will not
strike a conscious balance between expeditious repose and qualitative
results. Faced with a host of disincentives to litigation, they may ini-
tially choose arbitration as the most efficient process, only to regret the
choice later and attempt to appeal their way back into the jurisdiction
of the courts. This result is the most inefficient: arbitration becomes a
mere preliminary to litigation.
If disputants understood the ramifications of process choice in all
situations, however, they presumably would choose the formality of the
courts over the informality of ADR, all else being equal. But because
all else is not equal, contracting parties frequently opt to risk a virtu-
ally unreviewable decision that may be contrary to applicable law in
order to achieve quick repose. When private parties of equivalent bar-
gaining power enter the arbitration forum with eyes fully open in order
to resolve routine commercial disputes, the futile appeals that may fol-
low are merely a procedural inefficiency. The real problem is that the
range of arbitrable claims has been steadily expanding in recent years,
subsuming disputes of a nature that commercial arbitration was not
designed to resolve. When a party is dragged unwillingly into a forum
where claims need not be decided according to law, and the party never
even contemplated that a particular type of claim would be arbitrated,
the near futility of appeal raises disturbing substantive issues.
Rather than abandoning ADR altogether, a new ADR forum
should be created for certain categories of disputes.21 5 Although striking
a balance between quantitative and qualitative results has not been the
goal of any particular constituency,2 16 such a reform has become imper-
ative with the growth of the ADR movement and the concomitant con-
cern that substantive principles are being ignored in favor of simple
dispute resolution. Amending the Federal Arbitration Act and state
statutes to require adherence to substantive law cannot accomplish this
goal, because the informality of the arbitration forum is currently well-
suited to the resolution of simple commercial disputes. Thus, commer-
cial arbitration and the procedures created by the NJADR Act need
not be mutually exclusive. Rather, each forum has a discrete clientele:
arbitration can resolve disputes in which relatively little is at stake be-
tween the parties and the issues are routine, and the NJADR Act's
216 See Fuller, supra note 60, at 389 ("[B]efore we demand of lay arbiters that
they act like judges, we must place them in a context, and arm them with procedures,
that will make it possible for them to do their job properly and still act throughout like
judges.").
216 See Brunet, supra note 8, at 51.
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procedures can resolve disputes that are likely to involve statutory
rights or unsettled principles of law.
The most incisive criticism leveled at the NJADR Act is that it
needlessly legalizes the ADR process. While the term "legalization"
carries negative connotations in the realm of ADR, in this context it
connotes the best qualities of the judicial system: procedural regularity
and adherence to known principles of substantive law. Perhaps the in-
creased short-term costs are merely a necessary evil that must be en-
dured in order to protect the quality of justice dispensed by ADR, pre-
serve the normative benefits of litigation, and enforce the substantive
policies underlying particular rights. If this assessment is accurate, then
the long-term costs to society are likely to be reduced by relieving pres-
sure on the court system and increasing confidence in ADR. The forum
established by the NJADR Act would not necessarily lend any prece-
dential value to decisions rendered there. Instead, it would reduce the
incentive for parties to avoid the courts, because decisions would have
to be made and remedies imposed according to law. The inherent limi-
tation on the performance of this function is that parties may still opt
for the arbitration forum when it is truly more efficient.
Nevertheless, both court administrators and legal scholars should
greet the procedures of the Act with enthusiasm. Congress's considera-
tion of these procedures as the proposed Federal Alternative Procedure
for Dispute Resolution Act, and its possible adoption as a model statute
by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws, indicates a perception that a
gap exists in available modes of dispute resolution that is not unique to
New Jersey. Indeed, with the legitimization of arbitration and its rela-
tively unprincipled application by the nation's courts and legislatures as
an alternative to adjudication, the need for reform has become manifest.
The NJADR Act's innovative combination of substantive protection
and procedural efficiency promises a satisfactory response.
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